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Resolving the Conflict Between the Sherman Act
and the Robinson-Patman Act:
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.
Several lower federal court decisions have created a conflict between
the Sherman Act' and the Robinson-Patman Act2 in the context of the
exchange of current price information among competitors.3 This conflict
has affected competition in at least two undesirable ways. First, it has
prohibited the Sherman Act from striking down the anticompetitive
practice of exchanging current price information, and second, it has
inhibited procompetitive aspects of the Robinson-Patman Act.4 These
undesirable effects can be readily understood through an examination of
the interaction among the Sherman Act, the Robinson-Patman Act, and
the practice of exchanging current price information.
The exchange of price information has in many cases been held to
violate the Sherman Act, which proscribes agreements that have an undue
restraint on trade.5 An undue restraint on trade occurs particularly in
oligopolistic markets in which the exchange of price information has a
stabilizing effect on prices.6 Although the exchange of price information,
when it has this adverse effect on lOrices, is prohibited by the Sherman Act,
some courts have permitted it (even when prices are stabilized) when
undertaken to comply with the Robinson-Patman Act.
7
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Acte proscribes price
discrimination, which is the practice of charging two purchasers different
prices for goods of equal grade and quality, when the likely effect of such
discrimination is to lessen competition substantially. Sellers are permitted,
however, to discriminate under section 2(b) of the Act if the discriminatory
price offered to a particular buyer is made in good faith to meet a
competitor's lower price offered to the same buyer. 9 Good faith under
section 2(b) requires a seller, before he lowers his price to a single buyer, to
take action to find out if the buyer has in fact been offered a lower price by a
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976):
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
Eyery person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy
hereby declared to be illegalshall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, a conviction thereof, shall
be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person,
one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding threeyears, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). See note 64 infra.
3. See this Comment, Part I(D) (1) infra.
4. See Part I(D)(2) infra.
5. See note I supra.
6. See Part i(B) infra.
7. See Part I(D)(1) infra.
8. See note 2 supra.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976); see text accompanying note 69 infra.
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competitor.10 In the past, sellers had often felt that the appropriate, even
necessary, action to verify the price was to ask the competitor if he had
actually offered that price to the particular customer."' Some lower courts
have held that this "interseller price verification" was shielded from
scrutiny under the Sherman Act.'
2
These lower court decisions thus caused the Sherman Act to lose its
effectiveness in stopping the exchange of current price information.
Furthermore, the door was opened for sellers to disguise their intent to
stabilize prices through the exchange of price information by claiming the
exchange was for the purpose of establishing the section 2(b) defense.13
Finally, the lower court decisions inhibited the procompetitive force of
section 2(b). 14 Section 2(b) is a procompetitive measure because it permits
price discrimination, which in turn helps to break up the price floor in
oligopolistic markets by causing uncertainty in the prices charged by
competitors. If good faith under section 2(b) requires sellers to verify prices
with their competitors it becomes burdensome for a seller to establish the
defense. A sensible reading of section 2(b) would allow sellers to establish
good faith by means short of contacting competitors, thus making it easier
for the seller to establish the defense. The easier it is for sellers to establish
the section 2(b) defense, the more price discrimination will occur with its
resulting downward pressure on prices.15
The Supreme Court, in United States v. United States Gypsum Co,1 6
held that, contrary to the previous lower court decisions, interseller price
verification for the purpose of complying with section 2(b) must be
scrutinized under the Sherman Act 7 and that sellers no longer have
interseller price verification as an available means of establishing section
2(b) good faith.'8 In another section of its opinion the court held that intent
is an element of a criminal antitrust offense. 19 This latter facet of the
decision may have the effect of allowing interseller p rice verification to go
unpunished in a limited number of criminal cases even though it may have
stabilized prices in violation of the Sherman Act.
This Case Comment will consider both Gypsum's reconciliation of the
conflict between the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman Act created
by the lower court decisions and Gypsum's guidance regarding future price
10. See Part I(C)(I) infra.
11. Id.
12. See text accompanying notes 97-105 infra.
13. See Part I(D)(2) infra.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 2864 (1978).
17. Id. at 2884.
18. See id. at 2883.
19. Id. at 2876.
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exchange cases. It will be argued that the decision will have a
procompetitive effect. The procompetitive force of section 2(b) is
strengthened because sellers can establish good faith without contacting
their competitors. Sellers will thus be increasingly able to reduce their
prices to particular buyers in order to meet competition. Furthermore, the
Sherman Act can now operate against the anticompetitive effects of
interseller price verification without interference from the meeting-
competition defense of section 2(b). As to guidance on future price
exchange cases, the Gypsum case indicates that the stabilizing effect on
prices will be presumed in oligopolistic markets. Sellers will thus be forced
to show that the exchange in fact had a beneficial effect on competition, or,
at least, that it did not adversely effect competition.
I. HISTORICAL REFERENCE POINTS
A. Analysis Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes agreements or combinations
in restraint of trade.20 The Supreme Court, in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States,2 1 announced that competition is the rule of trade and that section I
reaches all unreasonable restraints on competition. 22 To determine
whether specific conduct is an unreasonable restraint on competition, the
courts generally apply a balancing test called the rule of reason.23 The test
can be distilled into three analytical steps. 24 First there must be an
agreement. Next, the court must evaluate the proffered justification for the
agreement. Since the purpose of the Sherman Act is to protect competition
the courts will not listen to ajustification that will restrict competition on
social grounds. 2 The final step in the analysis is whether the restriction
resulting from the agreement is necessary to reach the goal sought to be
achieved through the agreement. Within this step the court will consider a
number of factors, such as whether the restriction is overly broad and
whether it unduly affects competition. In trying to gauge the effect on
competition the court will evaluate the power of the defendants and the
overall structure of the market.26 In addition, the purpose or end sought to
be achieved by the defendants is an important factor, not because a good
intention will save an objectionable regulation, but rather because
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (quoted in pertinent part in note I supra).
21. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
22. Id. at 58-59.
23. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 2 AN'rRusT LAw 314b, at 47 (1978).
24. See generally National Soey of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978);
Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
25. The inquiry mandated by the rule of reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that
promotes or suppresses competition, not "whether a policy favoring competition is in the public
interest, or in the interest of the members of an industry." 435 U.S. at 692.
26. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23, at 49.
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knowledge of intent may help to divine the actual nature and effect of the
alleged anticompetitive conduct.27 In sum, the inquiry under the rule of
reason is whether, on the whole, competition is suppressed or promoted 28
In applying this standard of reasonableness the Supreme Court has
labeled certain practices inherently unreasonable. United States v. Socony
Vacuum Oil Co.29 first used the term "per se" unlawful to describe those
restraints on trade, such as price fixing agreements among competitors,
that will be presumed unreasonable without regard to proof in the
particular case of an adverse effect on competition. Thus, in a price fixing
case the government need only prove that an agreement among
competitors to fix or stabilize prices exists. Theperse doctrine, however, is
simply an application of the rule of reason: when experience has shown
that a particular practice has no justification but instead blatantly restricts
competition, further analysis is not needed.
One point should be emphasized. Whether a case is analyzed under
the rule of reason or the per se doctrine, one can be found to have violated
the Sherman Act regardless of intent. Prior to Gypsum the foregoing
analysis applied both to civil and criminal prosecutions under the Act.
3
Gypsum, however, held that intent is an element of a criminal offense
under the Sherman Act and that intent must be proved whether the case is
a per se or rule of reason type case. This distinction between civil and
criminal action must be kept in mind when studying the guidance the
Gypsum Court gives on future price information exchange cases.
27. Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). See A. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 63-72 (1977); see also United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 98 S. Ct. 2864, 2873 (1978).
28. National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. at 691-92.
29. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
30. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23. The policy and effect of the per se doctrine is
summed up in United States v. Northern Pacific Ry., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958):
ihere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use. This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the
type of restraints which are proscribdd by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of
everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and
prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as
related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been
unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 6 (1977), reaffirmed Northern Pacific in regard
to the test that must be met for per se purposes.
Among the practices that have been determined to beperse unreasonable are tying arrangements,
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); group boycotts, Fashion Originators'
Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (194 1); price fixing, United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940); division of markets, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899); and certain sales-commission systems for the marketing of tires, batteries, and
accessories by service stations affiliated with major oil companies, FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223
(1968).
31. 98 S. Ct. at 2892 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1979] SHERMAN ACT AND ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 479
B. Section 1 of the Sherman Act Applied to Information
Exchange Cases
The exchange among competitors of information, especially current
prices, is dangerous because of its tendency to stabilize prices, to cause
uniformity in services, and to eliminate other means of competition. The
courts have therefore invoked the Sherman Act to prevent these
anticompetitive effects by restricting the exchange of information among
competitors. Generally, rule of reason analysis has been used to determine
whether agreements to exchange information have unduly restricted trade.
This section will explore both the effect of the exchange of information,
especially current price information, on competition, and the way in which
the Court has applied the rule of reason to agreements among competitors
to exchange information.
The legality of the exchange of information among competitors under
the Sherman Act may depend on the structure of the market in which the
exchange occurs. In an unconcentrated market, when there are a large
number of competitors, total market information tends to promote
32
competition. Buyers of course prefer the lowest possible market price and
one producer produces so little relative to the total market that he has no
power to control that market price. He must, therefore, sell his product at
the market rate.33 In a competitive market the more information a seller
has available to him the more effectively he will respond to the buyer's
preference. In addition, sellers in this type of market have little incentive to
agree to fix prices or keep them artificially high. If one seller does cut his
prices his competitors are not hurt significantly because the loss of sales to
the price cutter is spread among a large number of competitors. 4 Also,
because there are so many competitors, it would be difficult to get enough
of them, with a significant enough aggregate market share, to enter into an
agreement that would be effective in stabilizing prices."
On the other hand, in an oligopolistic market with few competitors
36
the exchange of competitive information tends to stifle competition.
Competitors in an oligopolistic market are interdependent in the sense that
each seller's pricing decisions must take into account the pricing decisions
of his competitors. 37 A price cut by one seller in this market will substan-
32. See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333,342-43 (1969) (Marshall,J.,
dissenting).
33. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 13 (1974).
34. Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and
Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655, 665 (1962) (hereinafter cited as Conscious Parallellsn).
35. Id.
36. See P. AREEDA, supra note 33, at 15.
37. Conscious Parallelism, supra note 34, at 665-66. See also P. AREEDA, supra note 33, at 15.
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tially hurt a competitor because the loss of sales to the price cutter will be
spread over only a few competitors and will cut deeply into the market
share of those competitors.3 8 Thus, any price cut by one seller will be
quickly matched by his competitors. The result is that all sellers will end up
selling at a lower price without a corresponding increase in sales. Oligopo-
lists are therefore better off if they do not compete through pricing but
instead use their combined market strength to keep prices high.39 Rather
than encouraging price cuts, the exchange of competitive information can
thus help each seller to conform to, and to coordinate his pricing decisions
with, his competitors.
It should be noted that the cases to be discussed in this Comment
originated in oligopolistic market situations. Price competition was
especially important in these cases because the defendants sold identical
tangible goods, such as cement or lumber. These goods had no special
features to distinguish those sold by one seller from those sold by another.
Thus, the only real form of competition was difference in price." This
aspect should be kept in mind when considering the Supreme Court's
treatment of price exchange cases.
The Supreme Court has given varying treatment to the exchange of
information among competitors. In American Column & Lumber Co. v.
United States41 and United States v. American Linseed Oil Co. 42 the Court
discussed information exchanges controlled by trade associations. In each
case the court held that an agreement to exchange, through a trade
association, information regarding stock on hand, production, shipments,
names of purchasers, current price lists and schedules, terms of sale, and
current prices offered to specific customers was an unreasonable restraint
on trade under the Sherman Act. The agreements were coupled with
procedures to enforce the agreement and suggestions to participants con-
cerning proper levels of production and prices. In Maple Flooring Manu-
facturers Association v. United States43 the Court held that an agreement
to exchange past prices, production information, cost of transportation,
and stock on hand did not violate the Sherman Act when there were no
enforcement procedures and the participants were free to set their own
production and price levels. The Court in the first set of cases found that
the enforcement procedures evidenced a purpose to restrain competition,
rejecting the defendants' argument that their purpose was to make compe-
tition more efficient.44 One might generally say either that the Court did
38. See Conscious Parallelism, supra note 34, at 665.
39. Note, Interseller Price Verification and Hard Bargaining: Reconciliation of the Sherman
Act, Robinson-Patman Act, and the Forces of Competition, 46 FORDIIAM L. REv. 824,839-40 (1978)
(hereinafter cited as Interseller Price Verification).
40. See note 121 infra.
41. 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
42. 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
43. 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
44. 257 U.S. at 392-93; 262 U.S. at 380.
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not find a justification for the agreement, or that if it did accept the defen-
dants' justification, the restraint was not tailored narrowly enough to meet
the justification. 5 On the other hand, in Maple Flooring, the Court might
have been convinced that an exchange of past prices did not produce an
unreasonable restraint on competition or that the restraint was narrow
enough to meet the defendant's justification.
In Cement Manufacturers Protective Association v. United States6
the Supreme Court allowed the exchange between competitors of
information regarding production, price, and transportation costs. The
case concerned a suit under section 1 of the Sherman Act to dissolve a trade
association formed by several manufacturers of Portland Cement.
Members of the association were required to report to the association, and
it disseminated to the membership, detailed information about "specific
job contracts." Specific job contracts, used extensively by the manufac-
turers, obligated the manufacturers to deliver to the purchaser at a
minimum named price, payable on delivery, the cement required to
complete a specific construction project. The purchaser in this type of
contract had the advantage of not being obligated to take the cement
contracted for; thus he was able to take advantage of any decline in price
before delivery. The purpose of the association and its members in
collecting and disseminating the job-contract information was to prevent
job contractors from abusing the contract process in the event of a rising
market by fraudulently purchasing the cement required for a specific job
from several manufacturers. In allowing the exchange of information the
Court indicated that there is no unreasonable restraint on competition
when competitors provide one another with the kind of information
necessary to prevent overreaching by their customers.47 That is, the Court
found a justification for the agreement narrow enough to accomplish its
purpose without unduly restraining competition.
United States v. Container Corporation of America" is a significant
case in the development of a legal rule for price exchange cases. Container
is similar to Gypsum because of the type of price information that was
exchanged and the way in which it was exchanged. In Container each
defendant, upon request by a competitor, would furnish information
concerning the most recent price charged or quoted to individual
customers, with the expectation of reciprocity. Even though the
information was not exchanged on a regular basis the Court found
sufficient concerted action to establish an agreement under section 1, the
45. American Column & Lumber Co. and American Linseed Oil Co. also suggest that the
defendants did actually fix their prices, and that the information exchange was e'idence of a price-
fixing agreement. See note 126 infra.
46. 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
47. [1978] ANT'TrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. No. 892, at F-15.
48. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
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essence of the agreement being to furnish price information whenever
requested.49
The Court found the effect of this reciprocal exchange of price
information to be a stabilization of prices at a downward trend. 50 Even
though there was a continuation of some competition the Court held that
the reduction or limitation of price competition brought the case within the
scope of the Sherman Act. Justice Douglas, in his plurality opinion, cited
Socony- Vacuum5" and stated that interference with the setting of prices by
free market forces is per se unlawful.52 Although Douglas did use per se
language, Container probably does not stand for the proposition that an
agreement among competitors to exchange current price information is
per se unlawful under the Sherman Act. Justice Fortas, in a concurring
opinion,53 said that he did not interpret the Court as holding that such an
exchange was aper se violation of the Sherman Act. In Fortas' view there
was no need to consider the situation as aper se violation because there was
ample evidence to show an actual effect on prices. Justice Marshall, in a
dissenting opinion,54 felt the per se rule did not apply because the Court
had not applied it to similar cases in the past.55
The Court finally indicated that the rule of reason will be applied to
exchanges of current price information when it decided United States V.
Citizens & Southern National Bank.5s In Citizens & Southern the
defendant bank formed several banks in suburban areas around Atlanta.
Citizens & Southern acquired five percent of the stock of a bank while
officers, shareholders, and customers purchased a majority of the
remaining shares." These "de facto" branch banks were established
because state laws otherwise restricted branch banking.58 Cjtizens &
Southern provided these de facto branch banks with information
concerning current interest rates and service charges in effect at Citizens &
Southern.59
The Court in Citizens & Southern held that these exchanges of current
price information among competitors did not constitute per se violations
of the Sherman Act.60 In other words, there may be some instances in
49. Id. at 335.
50. Id. at 336.
51. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 370 U.S. 150 (1940).
52. 393 U.S. at 337.
53. Id. at 338-40.
54. Id. at 340-41.
55. Marshall stated that "[t]his Court has refused to apply a per se rule to exchanges of price
information in the past." Id. at 341. He then cited American Column & Lumber Co., American
Linseed, Maple Flooring, and Cement Manufacturers. See text accompanying notes 41.46 supra.
56. 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
57. Id. at 113.
58. Id. at 92.
59. A Georgia statute prohibited bank holding companies from acquiring more than five percent
of a bank's stock. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-207(a)(2) (1967 & Supp. -1974) (amended 1976),
60. 422 U.S. at 93.
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which an agreement among competitors to exchange current price
information may bejustified. Here the use of the information among the de
facto branch bank system had the effect of stabilizing the interest rates and
service charges throughout the de facto system, but the Court found that
the overall effect was to promote competition.6 Because of the statutory
restriction on branch banking the residents of suburban and rural areas
were a "captive market" for the local banks.62 The de facto branch banks
competed with the local banks and provided an option to local
customers.63 Even though the exchange of interest rates might be thought
to stabilize prices, the overall effect of permitting the de facto branch banks
to use the rates given to them was good. The Court found ajustification for
the agreement in the overall purpose of furthering competition, and the
alleged restraint was found to be tailored as the minimum necessary
inducement to get Citizens & Southern to engage in the procompetitive
activity. Without any method of stabilizing interest rates there would have
been no incentive to enter the suburban market.
The underlying thrust of the Court's opinions is that the rule of reason
will be applied to cases in which current prices are exchanged among
competitors. The normal situation would probably be close to that found
in Container. In such a situation-an oligopolistic market served by sellers
of identical goods-the exchange of current price information would tend
to inhibit competition, and as in Container the courts could easily find
an undue restraint on trade. On the other hand, Citizens & Southern en-
tails a peculiar set of facts in which the exchange furthered overall compe-
tition. In a situation like this the court must be careful to consider all of the
relevant factors, for a summary approach like that used in Container (in
which, it can be argued, the Court applied theperse rule) would produce
an inappropriate decision.
C. The Robinson-Patman Act
1. Satisfying Section 2(b) Good Faith Verification Requirement
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act 64 prohibits price dis-
crimination, which is the practice of charging two purchasers different
61. Id. at 117-20.
62. Id. at 118.
63. Id. at 119.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchasers involved insuch
discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or
resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any
insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and %% here the
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or ith
customers of either of them. ...
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
prices for goods of equal grade and quality when the likely effect of such
discrimination is to substantially lessen competition. Price discrimination
can have serious anticompetitive effects. One such effect is "primary line"
injury, or injury to the competitors of the seller. Primary line damage
occurs when a large seller sells at low prices to some customers in order to
gain a greater share of the market over his competitors or drive a smaller
competitor out of business. Another serious effect of price discrimination
is "secondary line" injury, or injury to the competitors of the buyer. For
example, a large buyer may be able to secure price advantages while a small
buyer may have to continue to purchase supplies at higher prices. 6 h
There are, however, statutory defenses to price discrimination."1 The
defense that is pertinent to the present discussion is contained in section
2(b) 67 of the Robinson-Patman Act. That section provides in pertinent
part that:
[N]othing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie
case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or
facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities used by a
competitor.
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC68 interpreted section 2(b) a; an absolute defense
to liability for price discrimination. 69 Thus, if the seller can establish that
the price discrimination was made in good faith to meet the equally low
price of a competitor, he will be exonerated from liability under section
2(a). The Court noted that "if a large customer requests his seller to meet a
temptingly lower price offered to him by one of his seller's competitors, the
seller may well find it essential, as a matter of business survival, to meet
that price rather than lose the customer."
70
Of course, in order for the seller to take advantage of section 2(b) he
must meet the good faith requirement established by that section. FTC v.
A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co.71 provides the most complete explanation
65. Note, Meeting Competition Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 90 HARV. L. REV, 1476, 1477-
78 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Meeting Competition).
66. Section 2(a) contains a cost justification defense. After the main liability provision, see note
60 supra, the statute provides that "nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make
only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the
differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or
delivered .. " 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). This defense is of little use to a manufacturer, however,
because in order for him to be able to use it he must present to the court cost studies of "virtually
prohibitive detail." See Meeting Competition, supra note 65, at 1483.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976).
68. 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
69. It can be argued that the § 2(b) meeting competition defense was intended only as a rule of
evidence that would enable the seller to rebut a prima facie case of price discrimination under § 2(d) by
showing that he made his price cut in good faith to meet competition. The burden would then shift to
the complainant to prove that the price discrimination resulted in competitive injury or was made In
bad faith. Such an interpretation is supported by the fact that the § 2(b) defense is contained in a section
apart from § 2(a) which contains affirmative defenses such as cost justification. See Meeting
Competition, supra note 65, at 1483-84.
70. 340 U.S. at 249. See generally id. at 244-50.
71. 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
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prior to Gypsum of the kind of showing that a seller must make in order to
satify the good faith requirement:
Section 2(b) does not require the seller to justify price discriminations by
showing that in fact they met a competitive price. But it does place on the
seller the burden of showing that the price was made in good faith to meet a
competitor's. . . We agree with the Commission that the statute at least
requires the seller, who has knowingly discriminated in price, to show the
existence of facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to
believe that the granting of a lower price would in fact meet the equally low
price of a competitor.
In Staley it was held that the section 2(b) defense had not been established
because the price discriminations were made in response to verbal
information received from salesmen, brokers, or purchasers without any
effort to "investigate or verify" these reports or the character and reliability
of the informants.73 In a companion case, Corn Products Refining Co. v.
FTC,74 the section 2(b) defense was not allowed because "[tihe only
evidence said to rebut the prima facie case made by proof of the price
discriminations was given by witnesses who had no personal knowledge of
the transactions, and was limited to statements of each witness's [sic]
assumption or conclusion that the price discriminations were justified by
competition., 7
5
The language of both Staley and Corn Products indicated that the
seller cannot satisfy the section 2(b) good faith requirement by relying
simply on his customer's statements that they have been offered lower
prices by the seller's competitors.76 The seller must make some sort of effort
to verify the customer's reports. He must base his decision to offer a
discriminatory price to a certain purchaser upon facts that would lead him
reasonably to believe he is in fact meeting the equally low price of a
77
competitor.
There are several ways in which sellers have met the verification
requirement imposed upon them by Staley.78 For instance, in Beatrice
Foods Co. 7 9 the Federal Trade Commission held that the seller's appraisal
of market conditions to determine the reliability of a buyer's report of a
72. Id. at 759-60.
73. Id. at 758.
74. 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
75! Id. at 741.
76. See Viviano Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 411 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1969). TheThird Circuit Court in
the Gypsum case read their decision in Viviano as meaning that a seller could not meet the § 2(b) good
faith requirement by merely accepting the purchaser's word with respect to competitors' offers. Instead
the seller would have to attempt to corroborate the report as well as the reliability of the purchaser or
other reporter. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 121 (1977). The Supreme
Court read Viviano as reaffirming Staley, but as not to require interseiler verification to satisfy the good
faith requirement, even in the particular circumstances identified by the court of appeals. 98 S. Ct. at
2881. See text accompanying notes 112-13, 164 infra.
77. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
78. See generally Interseller Price Verification, supra note 39, at 836-39.
79. 76 F.T.C. 719 (1969), aff'd sub nora. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir. 1971).
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competing price satisfied the section 2(b) good faith requirement. Other
cases have held that the meeting competition defense has been established
when the seller has cut his prices after he has first lost sales because of a
refusal to cut prices on the basis of a customer report.80 In addition, a seller
may be able to meet the Staley verification requirement when he has
received similar reports from more than one buyer about the lower price
offered by a competitor. 8'
The most controversial way in which some sellers have been able to
satisfy the section 2(b) requirement has been to verify customer reports
with their competitors to see if the competitors have in fact offered the
customer a lower price. Such interseller price verification may fall within
the proscription of section 1 of the Sherman Act, as in Container.2
2. Section 2(b)-A Procompetitive Force
Even though, in theory, the Robinson-Patman Act is designed to
combat the primary and secondary line harm of price discrimination,8 3
commentators have argued that section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act
is actually anticompetitive. These commentators argue that price
discrimination can be profitable only in a concentrated market (one that is
already a monopoly or oligopoly).84 As discussed before,85 a seller in an
unconcentrated market does not have the power to control the market
price and is thus forced to sell his entire output at the competitively
determined market price.8 6 The seller in a competitive market cannot,
therefore, offer the same goods to two different buyers at two different
prices. On the other hand, an oligopolist may have the power to price
discriminate with success by segregating his customers into groups having
different marginal intensities of demand. 7 He can then set his own prices
for each group without a significant risk of being undercut.88 Thus,
successful price discrimination presupposes highly concentrated markets,
the development of which the Robinson-Patman Act cannot forestall.89
As this Comment noted earlier,90 oligopolistic markets tend toward
80. See, e.g., International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir,
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
81. See Jones v. Borden Co., 430 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1970), andMcCaskill v. Texaco, Inc,, 351 F.
Supp. 1332 (S.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd mem. sub nom. Harrelson v. Texaco, Inc., 486 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir.
1973).
82. See text accompanying notes 48-53 supra.
83. See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
84. Meeting Competition, supra note 65, at 1480.
85. See text accompanying notes 32-39 supra.
86. Meeting Competition, supra note 65, at 1480.
87. Marginal intensity of demand refers to what a buyer is willing to pay for each additional unit
of product which he buys. Each buyer has a different marginal intensity of demand because each has a
unique combination of forces (demand for the product in a particular looale, cost of overhead, overall
efficiency in his operation, etc.) bearing upon him. Thus certain buyers may be willing or able to pay
more for the seller's product than other buyers would be willing or able to pay.
88. Meeting Competition, supra note 65, at 1480.
89. Id.
90. See notes 32-40 supra and accompanying text.
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price uniformity because a concession in price by one seller can be expected
to be followed by a concession by other sellers. Thus, a seller's advantage is
short-lived unless he can keep his price concession secret.91 If the secret
leaks out it will cause an undisciplined market and a downward pressure
on prices. Such "sporadic" price discrimination has only negligible
primary and secondary line effects. 92 But section 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act blindly prohibits such sporadic price discrimination and its
resulting procompetitive effects.
Section 2(b), however, can be viewed as a procompetitive measure
because it allows oligopolistic sellers to discriminate in price to meet a
competitor's lower price, and thus may help to break up the market
discipline. The procompetitive effect of section 2(b) is limited, though, by
the "meet-not-.beat" rule in section 2(b), which allows a seller to match, but
not undercut, his competitor's price.93 Thus, the competitor whose price
the seller is trying to match does not have to be concerned about his price
being undercut, and the effect of section 2(b) on market certainty is cut
short.
9 4
The "meet-not-beat" rule, however, does not require that a seller in
fact meet the competitor's lower price, for the requirement under section
2(b) is good faith. If the seller exhibits good faith he is allowed the defense
even if he actually undercuts his competitor's price.95 Therefore, the extent
to which the "meet-not-beat" requirement is anticompetitive depends
upon how much a seller must do to meet the good faith verification
requirement.96 If the seller is required, or even permitted, to verify the
report of a lower price with his competitor, the standard of good faith will
be higher and the seller will be expected to more closely match his
competitor's price.
D. Conflict Between the Sherman Act and Section 2(b)
of the Robinson-Patman Act
1. Section 2(b) as a Controlling Circumstance
In order for a seller to establish the section 2(b) meeting-competition
defense he must satisfy the good faith requirement. Recall that Staley and
Corn Products require a seller to verify in some way customer reports of
lower prices offered by competitors. 97 Often sellers have felt obligated,
because of uncertainty in the law and the unreliability of customer's
reports, to verify customer reports with competitors to ensure their
91. See P. AREEDA, supra note 33.
92. Meeting Competition, supra note 65, at 1482.
93. Id. at 1485. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
94. Id. at 1486.
95. See Continental Baking Co., 63 F.T.C. 2071, 2163 (1963).
96. See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
97. Id.
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satisfaction of the section 2(b) good faith requirement.98 If a seller verifies
the price offered to a customer by directly contacting his competitor and
discussing current price information, both he and his competitor may be
violating section 1 of the Sherman Act.99
Two important exchange cases have, however, provided the lower
courts with an avenue of escape from this dilemma. In Cement
Manufacturers the Supreme Court allowed the exchange among
competitors of information concerning production, price, and transporta-
tion costs when the purpose of the exchange was to enable the defendants
to prevent the perpetration of fraud against them by their customers. 1°°
The Court in Container subsequently held that the exchange of
information concerning specific sales to identified customers violated the
Sherman Act, and apparently distinguished that case from Cement
Manufacturers by recognizing an exception which would make an
otherwise invalid restraint on trade justifiable:10 1
While there was present here, as in Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United
States, 268 U.S. 588, an exchange of prices to specific customers, there was
absent the controlling circumstances, viz., that cement manufacturers, to
protect themselves from delivering to contractors more than was needed for a
specificjob and thus receiving a lower price, exchanged price information as a
means of protecting their legal rights from fraudulent inducements to deliver
more cement than needed for a specific job.02
Many courts inferred from the use of the phrase "controlling cir-
cumstances" that the exception to Sherman Act liability for the exchange
of competitive information was not limited to the special circumstances of
Cement Manufacturers.
After Container, several lower courts had held that the controlling
circumstance exception encompasses exchanges of price information
undertaken for the purpose of establishing a meeting..competition defense
under section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act. In Wall Products Co. v.
National Gypsum Co.103 competitors telephoned each other to verify
customers' reports that a competitor had offered the customers a lower
price on gypsum board. The district court found that interseller price
verification was used only when the defendants were unable to satisfy
themselves of the accuracy of the customer-reported deviations in price by
other means. The court noted this restricted use of the practice of
interseller price verification and stated that if practiced within these limits
98. See text accompanying notes 127-28 infra.
99. See text accompanying notes 48-54 supra.
100. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
101. One could argue that Container is an abrupt departure from Cement Manufacturers
because it does not focus on purpose as did Cement Manufacturers. See interseller Price Verification,
supra note 39, at 842-43. On the other hand, it could be said that the Court focused on purpose in
Cement Manufacturers because there was a justification for the agreement in that case.
102. 393 U.S. at 335 (emphasis added).
103. 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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it would be tolerated. The passage from Container quoted above °4 was
cited and the court stated that the defendants' duty to establish good faith
adherence to the Robinson-Patman Act constituted a circumstance
equally as compelling and controlling as that found in Cement Manufac-
turers. 1
05
Three other lower court cases have followed Wall Products in
characterizing compliance with section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act
as a controlling circumstance for Sherman Act purposes. In each of the
three cases a major oil company conferred with its competitors during a
gasoline price war in order to verify its competitor's prices before granting
temporary allowances to its own retailers. Both Webster v. Sinclair
Refining Co.106 and Belliston v. Texaco, Inc.10 7 cited Wall Products forthe
controlling circumstance proposition. The third case, Gray v. Shell Oil
Co., ,°' held that the jury had to decide whether the purpose of Shell's
communications with its competitors was to comply with the Robinson-
Patman Act; because thejury in Gray found that purpose, the court upheld
a verdict of no Sherman Act liability. These three gasoline price war cases
significantly expanded upon Wall Products because none of them required
that alternative means of corroboration be exhausted before using direct
verification with a competitor.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in United Statesv. UnitedStates
Gypsum Co.,'0 9 recognized the inherent dangers in the gasoline price war
decisions. The court felt that the decisions would undermine Container by
giving competitors a free license to exchange price information. Such a
license might be used to camouflage illegitimate agreements. Furthermore,
according to Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC,'0 the Sherman
Act is supposed to take precedence over the Robinson-Patman Act.' 11 The
gasoline cases, however, had given the Robinson-Patman Act precedent
over the Sherman Act. In order to guard against these dangers the court
strictly limited the circumstances in which competitors could comply with
the section 2(b) good faith requirement by exchanging price information.
The interseller verifier must have engaged in the practice solely to comply
with the Robinson-Patman Act; he must have first resorted to all other
reasonable means of corroboration, without success; he must have had
good, independent reasons to doubt the buyer's truthfulness; and the
communication with his competitor must have been strictly limited to the
104. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
105. 326 F. Supp. at 313.
106. 338 F. Supp. 248, 251-52 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
107. 455 F.2d 175, 182 (10th Cir.), ceri. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972).
108. 469 F.2d 742, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S: 943 (1973).
109. 550 F.2d 115 (1977).
110. 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
111. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d at 125.
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one price and one buyer at issue.' 12 Thus, the Third Circuit recognized
section 2(b) compliance as a controlling circumstance, but tried to limit its
encroachment on the Sherman Act.
2. Dangers in a Section 2(b) Controlling Circumstance
Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be permitted to
be a justification for interseller price verification under the Sherman Act.
The meeting-competition defense is a procompetitive measure that can
help break up an oligopolistic market discipline and should, therefore, be
liberally construed. To permit section 2(b) to allow the exchange of price
information, however, has the unintended result of interfering with section
1 of the Sherman Act while not advancing the procompetitive nature of
section 2(b).
This conflict between the two acts not only results in stabilized prices
but it also thwarts the use of the Sherman Act in policing hardcore anti-
competitive arrangements such as price-fixing agreements.1 3 In a report
on the Robinson-Patman Act the United States Department of Justice
explained that in some industries there are extensive exchanges of
information for the alleged purpose of complying with the Robinson-
Patman Act. The report noted the ease with which such an exchange of
information can evolve into an agreement for the reciprocal exchange of
price information and even into a full-fledged price-fixing agreement.
114
In an oligopolistic market the exchange of price information may be a
definite sign of an agreement of some sort between sellers, for the exchange
will take place only if benefits accrue to the participants. It will be recalled
that in an oligopolistic market"5 a seller can gain an advantage over his
competitors by granting a secret price concession to attract customers.1 6 If
his competitors were to learn of the concession they would, of course,
lower their prices in order to preserve their market share. The resulting
downward trend in prices will cause the original price cutter and every
112. Id. at 126.
113. This concern was one ofthe reasons why theThird Circuit in Gyjpsu n strictly limited the use
of interseller price verification to comply with the § 2(b) meeting-corrpetition defense, See text
accompanying notes 109-11 supra.
114. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT ON TIlE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 58-61
(1977).
[Y]ou find in some industries relatively extensive exchanges of price information for the
purpose, at least the stated purpose, of complying with the Robinsork-Patman Act ....
Now, the mere exchange of price information itself may tend to stabilize prices, But I
think it is also relatively common that once the exchange process begins, certain
understandings go along with it-that we will exchange prices, but it will be understood, for
example, you will not undercut my prices.
And from there it is a rather easy step into a full-fledged price-fixing agreement. I think
we have seen that from time to time, and I suspect we will continue to see it as long as there
continues to be a need to justify particular price discrimination in the terms of the Robinson-
Patman Act."
Id. at 60 (quoting testimony of Thomas E. Kauper).
115. See text accompanying notes 32-39 supra.
116. See P. AREEDA, supra note 33, at 15.
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other seller to be in a worse position than when he originally offered his
price concession, for he must now sell at a lower price without a corres-
ponding increase in volume. Thus, if a seller were asked by a competitor to
verify a report that the seller had offered a discount to a particular buyer it
would be against the economic interests of the seller to reveal the discount:
a seller would never reveal his price discounts to his competitors unless
they had previously agreed to reveal their prices to him. Such an agreement
could be used to police industry prices in order to keep them artificially
high. If there were no such agreement sellers would not benefit by revealing
their price concessions to competitors.'
17
This analysis points to another fallacy concerning the use ofinterseller
price verification. Sellers have argued that they must verify customer
reports with their competitors because their customers are inherently
unreliable."' The customer will bargain for the best price possible and
cannot be expected to give the seller an accurate report concerning offers of
lower prices given to them by the seller's competitors." 9 The foregoing
analysis shows that absent an agreement to verify or fix prices competitors
are also unreliable and should not be contacted to establish good faith
under section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Interseller price verification also fails to promote the procompetitive
nature of section 2(b). If sellers were allowed to establish good faith by
means short of contacting competitors they could be much more flexible in
granting price concessions which would, in turn, better enable section 2(b)
to break up the oligopolistic market discipline. Good faith under section
2(b) does not require interseller price verification. There are other ways of
establishing good faith, one of the best of which is to assess market data to
determine the reasonableness of a customer's report.
1 20
II. THE Gypsum DECISION
A. Facts and Issues
In 1973, the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission
filed an indictment in federal court charging six major gypsum board' 21
117. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. at 2883-84;3feeting Competition.
supra note 65, at 1492-93.
118. See text accompanying note 98 supra. See also Interseller Price Verification, supra note 39,
at 834-36.
119. Interseller Price Verification, supra note 39, at 825-26.
120. See text accompanying notes 78-81 supra.
121. Gypsum board is a type of laminated wall board. The gypsum industry has many of the
characteristics of an oligopoly. See text accompanying notes 32-39 supra. The gypsum board industry
is highly concentrated and during the period in question (1960-1973) eight companies accounted for
94% of national sales. Gypsum board is a tangible product and the purchaser's choice between com-
peting suppliers depends upon differences in price, credit terms, and delivery services. Overall demand
for the product is a function of the level ofconstruction activity; a price decrease throughout the indus-
try would not cause industry sales to rise and a price decrease by one or two manufacturers would only
gain them a temporary increase in market share, until other manufacturers followed suit. 98 S. Ct. at
2868. Because of this the industry manufacturers have a strong incentive to stay out of a pricew arand
keep industry prices high. Complete market information facilitates this interest.
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manufacturers and their corporate officials 22 with engaging in a
combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.'23 At trial the Government
focused its case on its allegation that the gypsum board manufacturers
participated in a "continuing agreement understanding and concert of
action to (a) raise, fix, maintain and stabilize the prices of gypsum
board."' 124 The Government's case on this price fixing charge centered on
the defendants' practice of interseller price verification. An officer of one
gypsum board manufacturer would telephone a competing firm's officer to
determine the price at which the competitor was offering gypsum board to
a specific customer.1
25
The Government maintained that the price exchanges were part of an
agreement among the defendants, that the exchanges had the effect of
stabilizing prices, that they were used to police agreed upon price increases,
and that they were undertaken on a frequent basis. 26 Defendants disputed
the scope and duration of the verification activities and contended that the
exchanges of price information that did occur were for the purpose of
complying with the Robinson-Patman Act. 127 The verification practice,
defendants said, was designed to comply with the dictates of Staley and
Viviano,128 which required verification of customers' reports. Defendants
asserted that all discounting off list prices was not reflected in invoices; they
could not, therefore, verify the customers' reports by checking the
competitor's invoices. 29 In addition, purchasers of the gypsum board were
notoriously unreliable and had often lied about a competitor's offer in
order to "whipsaw" a price cut. Therefore, the defendants argued, they had
122. The corporation defendants named in the indictment were United States Gypsum
Company, National Gypsum Company, Georgia Pacific Corporation, Kaiser-Gypsum Company,
Inc., the Celotex Corporation, and the Flintkote Company. The individual defendants included the
Chairman of the Board and the Executive Vice-President for sales of National Gypsum, the President
of Georgia Pacific, the President and the Vice-President and General Manager of Kaiser-Gypsum, the
President of Celotex, and the Chairman of the Board and the President of Flintkote. The Gypsum
Association was named as an unindicted co-conspirator as were two other gypsum board producers-
Johns-Manville Corporation and Fibreboard Corporation. 98 S.Ct. at 2868.
Nine of the defendants pleaded nolo contendere and were sentenced. Id. at 2869. The remaining
corporate defendants were United States Gypsum, National Gypsum, Georgia Pacific, and Celotex,
and the remaining individual defendants were the chairman of the Board and the Vice-President of
sales of National Gypsum and the Executive Vice-President of United States Gypsum. Id. at 2869 n3,
123. Id. at 286-69.
124. Id.
125. 550 F.2d at 120.
126. Id. It is difficult to tell exactly what theory of liability the Government vyas arguing in this
case. At least two theories have been advanced. The first theory is that the exchange of pilce
information is evidence of a price fixing agreement, which isper se unlawful under the Sherman Act.
See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra. The other theory is that an agreement to exchange prices
simply facilitates anticompetitive action which is too dangerous to be allowed. See [1978] ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. No. 892, at F-4. See generally text accompanying notes 115-117 supra,
127. 550 F.2d at 120. Defendants also contended that they used interseller price verification to
prevent customer fraud in order to come under the Cement Manufacturers exception to Sherman Act
liability, but the court rejected this argument. 98 S. Ct. at 2879 n.24.
128. See note 71 and accompanying text.
129. 550 F.2d at 121.
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three choices: (1) forego the price cut and risk losing the sale; (2) offer the
reduced price on the basis of the purchaser's unconfirmed report and risk
Robinson-Patman liability; or (3) call the competitor to verify his offer,
and establish a section 2(b) defense to any Robinson-Patman charge
concerning the price cut. 30 They chose the third alternative. The
defendants contended such conduct was within the "controlling cir-
cumstances" exception to Sherman Act liability, 31 and should have one of
two effects. At the extreme the purpose to comply with section 2(b) of the
Robinson-Patman Act should preclude, "as a matter of law, consideration
of the defendants' guilt on the price fixing charge, and at the minimum
make defendants' purpose in engaging in such communication a threshold
factual question."'. 32 In other words, if the court were to find that the
defendants' purpose was to comply with the Robinson-Patman defense,
their conduct should not be scrutinized under the Sherman Act at all. If
this approach was not accepted, the court should at least determine the
defendants' purpose in order to determine whether they could be held
criminally liable.
The instructions to the jury provided that if the exchange of price
information was found to have been undertaken in a good faith effort to
comply with the Robinson-Patman Act, verification standing alone would
not be sufficient to establish an illegal price fixing agreement.'" The next
part of the instruction, though, seemed to indicate that purpose was
irrelevant if the jury found that the effect of verification was to fix,
maintain, or stabilize prices: "However, if you decide that the effect of
these exchanges was to raise, fix, maintain, and stabilize the price of
gypsum wallboard, then you may consider these exchanges as evidence of a
mutual agreement or understanding alleged in the indictment to raise, fix,
"maintain and stabilize list prices.' 34 The instructions on verification
closed with the following:
[t]he law presumes that a person intends the necessary and natural
consequences of his acts. Therefore, if the effect of the exchanges of pricing
information was to raise, fix, maintain and stabilize prices, then the parties to
them are presumed, as a matter of law, to have intended that result.'"
The jury returned guilty verdicts against each of the defendants and
the case was sent to the appellate court with the price fixing issue in the
following terms: Should the purpose of complying with the Robinson-
Patman Act be ajustification for interseller price verification activities that
would withdraw those activities from Sherman Act scrutiny? The Third
130. Id. at 122.
131. See Part I(D) supra.




OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
Circuit held that such a justification does exist but only in the very limited
scope set out previously. 36 Defendants were entitled to an instruction
that their verification practices would not violate the Sherman Act if the
jury found that the defendants' purpose was to comply with the Robinson-
Patman Act and that they stayed within the scope set out by the appel-
late court.t 37 The appellate court in effect limited the consideration of pur-
pose to the question of intention to comply with the Robinson-Patman
Act (and other possible "controlling circumstances").
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, but for a
much different reason. The Court held both that intent is an element of a
criminal antitrust offense and that the purpose of complying with section
2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act does not exclude one from Sherman Act
scrutiny. 138
B. The Supreme Court Decision
1. Intent as an Element of a Criminal Antitrust Offense
The Supreme Court did not base its conclusion on the intent issue
upon an apparent conflict between the Sherman Act. and the Robinson-
Patman Act as did the court of appeals, but upon general principles of
criminal liability.1
39
[W]e hold that a defendant's state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal
antitrust offense which must be established by evidence and inferences drawn
therefrom and cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a
legal presumption of wrongful intent from proof of an effect on prices. 4
Thus, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendants intended, by their verification practices, to fix, maintain, or
stabilize prices.
The Court enumerated two culpable states of mind that will satisfy the
intent requirement under the Sherman Act. First, if one undertakes the
conduct with the "conscious object" of producing anticompetitive effects,
one possesses the requisite intent.' 4' Second, if the conduct is shown to
have been undertaken with the knowledge that the proscribed effects
would most likely occur, the actor possesses the requisite state of mind.
14 2
In order for knowledge to suffice, though, the proscribed anticompetitive
effects must also be demonstrated. 43 In effect, when the anticompetitive
136. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
137. 98 S. Ct. at 2872.
138. Id.
139. The court relied on the principle that intent is generally an indispensible clement of a
criminal offense. 98 S. Ct. at 2872-76. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
140. 98 S. Ct. at 2872.
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effects (e.g., stabilization of prices through interseller price verification)
have been shown, the Government need not establish the defendant's
subjective purpose to bring about the anticompetitive results. Instead, the
Government is put to the lesser burden of showing the defendants'
knowledge of the probable consequences. 44
2. Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act-
Not a Shield from Sherman Act Scrutiny
The Court held that exchanges of price information, even though for
the purpose of complying with the Robinson-Patman Act, remain subject
to close scrutiny under the Sherman Act.1 45 In other words, if a seller
verifies prices with a competitor in order to establish the Robinson-
Patman meeting competition defense, he is not automatically relieved
from Sherman Act liability, even if he remains within the limitation set
forth by the court of appeals. 146 Thus, Robinson-Patman compliance is
not a so-called "controlling circumstance."' 47
The Court, rejecting the Wall Products court's and the appellate
court's reading of Staley, 48 held that the section 2(b) good faith standard
can be satisfied without the use of interseller price verification. 49 A seller
may acquire his good faith, commercially reasonable belief that his price
concession is necessary to meet an equally low price of a competitor, by
doing everything reasonably feasible to determine the truthfulness of a
customer's statement that the customer has been offered a lower price as
long as he does not violate another statute. "If, after making reasonable,
lawful, [sic] inquiries, the seller cannot ascertain the buyer is lying, the
seller is entitled to make the sale."'1
50
The Court noted a number of factors that the Federal Trade
Commission or a court should consider in appraising a seller's good faith
in meeting a competing offer. Such factors include evidence that the seller
had received reports of similar discounts from other customers, that he had
been threatened with a termination of purchases if the discounts were not
met, and that he had made efforts to corroborate the reported discount by
seeking documentary evidence or by appraising its reasonableness in terms
of available market data. All these ways of complying with the verification
structure of Staley and section 2(b) good faith have been used successfully
in the past, as discussed before. 1
144. Id. n.21.
145. Id. at 2884. The Court did not address the more general issue concerning the existence and
proper scope of the controlling circumstances exception to Sherman Act liability. Id. at 2880.
146. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
147. 98 S. CL at 2884.
148. See text accompanying notes 103-09 supra.
149. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
150. 98 S. Ct. at 2882 n.29.
151. See text accompanying notes 78-81 supra. In A & P v. FTC, 47 U.S.L.W. 4167 (1979),
Borden, the long-time supplier of milk toA & P, lowered its bid on the price of milk to A & P in order to
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In any event, the Court seems to say that the Staley verification
requirement applies only when there are grounds for disbelieving the
customer. 52 When there are grounds for disbelieving the customer the
seller need only take reasonable steps to investigate and, as stated above,
if he "cannot ascertain that the buyer is lying," the meeting-competition
defense is available to him.153 Therefore, the seller who acts with the honest
belief that he is meeting competition, even though he may be mistaken, is
greatly benefited. 54 The Court states, however, that in a limited number of
cases the section 2(b) defense to price discrimination may be unavailable.
A seller may have substantial reasons to doubt the accuracy of reports of a
competing offer and may be unable to corroborate such reports in any of
the accepted ways. Unanswered questions about the reliability of a buyer's
representation may be inconsistent with a good faith belief that a
competing offer had been made, rendering the section 2(b) defense
unavailabie. 55 in such a case interseller verification as a meaf°,i of
checking the buyer's reliability seems like a possible solution to the seller's
dilemma. But the Court stated it would still not permit interseller verifi-
cation because the seller's competitor, who is also an unreliable source of
information, cannot be relied upon to establish good faith under sectior
2(b). t56 Therefore, the section 2(b) defense to price discrimination will
simply remain unavailable in such a situation.157 Even so, the Court seems
to encourage the seller to make the sale. In a footnote 58 the Court hints
that it wants to make section 2(b) an economically meaningful defense to
price discrimination and that a seller's honest reliance on his customer's
reports will in most cases allow him to make a legitimate price con-
cession. 59 The Court cites section 2(f)1 60 of the Robinson-Patman Act,
which makes it unlawful for a buyer to receive knowingly an unlawful dis-
criminatory price. In Beatrice Foods Co. t61 the FTC permitted the seller
the section 2(b) defense because he acted in good faith, while it held the
buyer liable under section 2(f). It would seem that the Court is indicating
meet a lower price offered to A & P by a competitor. Borden simply lowered its bid in reliance on
A & P's report that Borden's bid was "not even in the ball park" and that Borden was in danger of losing
the A & P account. Id. at 4171. A & P offered to let Borden submit ainother bid, contrary to A & P's
practice. The court held that Borden, in light of its business relationship with A & P, had satisfied § 2(b)
good faith. Id. at 4171.
152. See [1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 892, at F-17.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 98 S. Ct. at 2883.
156. 98 S. Ct. at 2883-84. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
157. See 98 S. Ct. at 2890 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
158. 98 S. Ct. at 2882 n.30.
159. See [1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 892, at F-16-17.
160. 15 U.S.C. § 13(0: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this
section." The Court noted that its conclusions regarding the proper interpretation of § 2(f) may affect
subsequent application of § 2(b). 98 S. Ct. at 2883 n.31.
161. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'g Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F.TC. 719
(1969).
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that increased buyer liability may make it easier for the seller to rely on the
buyer's reports. 62 Also, in the recent decision of A &Pv. FTC163 the Court
continued in its effort to make section 2(b) a meaningful defense by holding
that the seller satisfied section 2(b) good faith by simply communicating
with the buyer.
64
In sum, the seller need not verify prices with a competitor in order to
satisfy the good faith requirement of section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman
Act. In fact, under the above analysis the section 2(b) defense will never be
available through the use of interseller price verification. Furthermore, the
seller must not verify prices with a competitor if he wants to stay clear of
possible Sherman Act liability.
Il. EFFECT OF THE Gypsum DECISION
Gypsum strengthens the policies both of section I of the Sherman Act
and Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act. The decision is
procompetitive because it eliminates the apparent conflict between section
1 and section 2(b) that had developed in the lower courts before Gypsum.
By abolishing section 2(b) as a controlling circumstance the Court has
taken a significant step forward to ensure that the two Acts serve their
procompetitive purposes. Section 2(b) can now better serve its function of
breaking up the oligopolistic market discipline by allowing sellers to
discriminate in price. The policy behind the section will not be defeated by
interseller verification and its stabilizing effect on prices. Furthermore,
buyers can now be certain that they need not verify prices directly with
their competitors to establish the meeting-competition defense. 65 Because
interseller verification cannot be used, sellers cannot be expected to match
the competitor's lower price to comply with the meet-not-beat rule.' This
relaxed good faith requirement, not requiring perfect knowledge, helps to
take the floor out of the price concessions allowed by section 2(b), resulting
in a little more uncertainty in the market. 67 Recall that in an oligopolistic
market uncertainty helps to cause a downward pressure on prices.' 6
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is now freed from the shackles of section
2(b). All information exchange cases, including the exchange of current
price information, will be scrutinized under the Sherman Act. Although
the Gypsum Court does not specifically state how the exchange of current
162. In the recent decision of A & P v. FTC, 47 U.S.L.W. 4167 (1979), the Court held that a
buyer cannot be held to have violated § 2(0 if the seller has established the meeting-competition
defense. "Accordingly, we hold that a buyer who had done no more than accept thelowcrof two prices
competitively offered does not violate § 2(1) provided thesellerhasa meeting competition defene." Id.
at 4171. But this decision does not mean that the seller cannot claim the meting-competition defense if
the buyer has violated § 2(0.
163. 47 U.S.L.W. 4167 (1979).
164. See note 151 supra.
165. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
166. See text accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
167. Id.
168. See text accompanying notes 92-93 supra.
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price information should be treated in the future, it gives the lower courts a
strong hint. The Court indicates that the stabilizing effect on price should
be presumed 169 in oligopolistic markets when it says that it recognizes the
"tendency for price discussions between competitors to contribute to the
stability of oligopolistic prices and open the way for growth of prohibited
anticompetitive activity,"'' 7 0 and that the exchange of price information
will remain subject to "close scrutiny" under the Sherman Act.' 7 1 Under
such a presumption it would be up to the seller to show that the exchange
did not have an adverse impact on competition. This approach is desirable
because it would allow the exchange of price information in cases like
Citizens & Southern. Thus the Court seems to support the employment of
the rule of reason in a way that will both make short work of harmful price
exchanges in the majority of cases, and leave room for beneficial price
exchanges.
One must also be aware that cases will now be treated differently when
there is a criminal prosecution under the Sherman Act. 72 The prosecution
has the burden of proving criminal intent whether the rule of reason or the
per se doctrine is applied. In a Container-type situation, when there is an
oligopolistic market, the prosecutor will easily be able to prove a
stabilization of prices as a result of the exchange of current price
information. 173 In a civil case the court may then find an undue restraint on
trade under the Sherman Act. In a criminal case, however, the prosecutor
must prove that the defendants entered into the agreement to exchange
price information with the conscious object of producing the stabilization
of prices, or that the defendants knew that stabilization of prices would
most likely occur. 7 4 It would not be difficult for the fact finder to infer that
sellers operating in an oligopolistic market would know that the exchange
of price information would most likely stabilize industry prices. The
prosecutor will have a more difficult time, however, in peculiar cases such
as Citizens & Southern. In such cases there are more legal motives possible
for competitors to exchange price information.
75
Finally, the Gypsum decision reduces the possibility of sellers using
the Robinson-Patman Act to cover hard-core price fixing agreements .
76
Prior to Gypsum the Government might have tried to prove a price
fixing agreement by using the interseller exchange of current prices as
169. A presumption may not be permitted in a criminal prosecution under the Sherman Act,
however, because the Government must prove every element of the offense. See Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197 (1977).
170. 98 S. Ct. at 2884.
171. Id.
172. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
173. Recall that if theper se doctrine is hpplied the prosecutor need only prove an agreement to
exchange prices. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
174. See text accompanying note 142 supra.
175. See [1978] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 892, at F-13.
176. See text accompanying notes 113-14 supra.
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evidence of such an agreement. Defendants would use section 2(b) of the
Robinson-Patman Act as a defense, which could shield their conduct from
Sherman Act scrutiny. Now the conduct must be scrutinized under the
Sherman Act and the courts can use it to enjoin such price fixing
agreements.
IV. CONCLUSION
The exchange of information among competitors can be dangerous in
oligopolistic markets because of its tendency to stabilize prices and other
factors of competition. In a few cases, such as Citizens & Southern and
Cement Manufacturers, the Supreme Court permitted the exchange of
competitive information, including price information. Even so, these
exchanges were scrutinized under the Sherman Act.
Some lower courts, beginning with Wall Products, allowed the
exchange of current price information among competitors without
scrutinizing the conduct under the Sherman Act. If sellers verified prices
with their competitors for the purpose of establishing good faith under
section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act their conduct was shielded from
Sherman Act liability. The lower courts had thus created a conflict
between the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman Act that inhibited
the use of the Sherman Act in striking down undue restraints on trade. At
the same time the lower court decisions did not enhance the procompeti-
tive nature of section 2(b), which could help break the price floor in
oligopolistic markets.
The Gypsum decision reconciles the conflict between the two Acts
created by the lower courts by allowing the establishment of good faith
under section 2(b) by means short of interseller price verification and by
requiring that all information exchange cases be subjected to Sherman Act
scrutiny. Both Acts can now work independently and be used in
procompetitive ways. Meanwhile, the Court indicates that the exchange
among competitors of current price information will be closely scrutinized
under the Sherman Act.
R. Jeffrey Harris

